Debates regarding the existence and feasibility of objectivity have been commonplace within the sciences, and are a major focus of behavioral science and philosophy research. The philosophical belief of dualism as a response to the mind-body debate asks the question, “What is the relationship between mind and body? Or: what is the relationship between mental properties and physical properties?” (Robinson, 2020). Mind-body dualism, developed by Rene Descartes in the 16th century,“evolved from propositions that the mind and body exist independently and do not interact” (Moini et al., 2024).

The question of whether objectivity can exist, or whether the mind is separable from the body, is inextricably linked to philosophical dualism,  as it implies that conscious objectivity is generated only through reasoning. According to mind-body dualism, the mind, distinct from the body, is a non-physical “thinking substance” that examines its own ideas through an inward-looking process, while the physical body can be perceived through sensory experience (Descartes, 1641/2008). As epistemology, cognitive neuroscience, and socio-cultural frameworks demonstrate, objectivity should not be thought of as completely confined to the mind. While objectivity is partially within the mind, it cannot be differentiated from influencing variables outside the mind, thereby being externally constructed (Descartes, 1641/2008, p.58; Robinson, 2020).

Philosophers such as Descartes argue that humans possess an innate capacity for objectivity within the mind. In Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes (1641/2008) outlines an early approach to the concept of objectivity as reliable and “non-deceitful”. According to Descartes, the mind, or thinking substance, is immaterial and capable of self-reflection and understanding. The body, or extended substance, is material and can be perceived through the senses. When the mind understands, it is engaging in pure thought, turning inward to examine its own ideas.

Piaget’s theory of cognitive development corroborates this view by supporting the notion that objectivity, to some extent, can exist in the mind once objective abilities have been developed. The theory has become a foundational basis for developmental psychology. It suggests that most developmentally typical humans exhibit innate abilities to develop and refine abilities to engage in increasingly systematic thinking and logical reasoning. During the Concrete Operational Stage,children aged 7 to 11 years begin using logical operations when solving problems, including mastery of conservation and inductive reasoning. The subsequent Formal Operational Stage suggests that an adolescent can use logical operations alongside the ability to understand theories, hypothesize, and comprehend abstract ideas like love and justice (Malik & Marwaha, 2023). Abstract reasoning is thus separate from the external world, as a non-observable process concerned with theoretical matters. This also provides evidence for the mind’s separation from the observable world through its ability to engage in abstract and theoretical reasoning, removed from sensory experience.

Although humans almost universally develop the capacity for objective perception and cognition during neurodevelopment, when making attempts at objective judgements, biases in our attention, perception, memory, and rationalization prevent objectivity from completely existing in the mind.

Contrary to an understanding of humans as logical agents, developments in cognitive science have demonstrated how cognitive processes frame perceptions of objectivity. Humans are capable of identifying and deducing deceivable worldly matters given perfectly symmetric information, thus effectively achieving substance dualism. However, it is far more realistic to examine the mind when faced with uncertain and rapid decision making as proof of its rationality.

The susceptibility of objective reasoning is particularly observable in rapid decision making under uncertainty. In such instances, the mind reduces cognitive effort by employing a variety of “heuristics”. Kahneman and Tversky (1974) noted that “subjective assessment of probability resembles the subjective assessment of physical quantities such as distance or size" and that such judgments rely on “data of limited validity” in adherence to heuristic rules (p. 1124). As such, their findings directly establish a concept of objectivity within cognitive science. They do so by describing commonly employed mental shortcuts that undermine our comprehension of reality.

Broader efforts to systematize such findings have established the concept of “bounded rationality”. According to Simon (1978), what is perceived as an optimal and rational decision is fundamentally determined by several things. Namely, “access to information and the computational capacities possessed by organisms, including man”. In an event, such as asset trading, judgments based on incomplete or otherwise limited information led individuals to make decisions inconsistent with maximizing utility, or otherwise engage in practices with objective losses. Similar instances of sub-optimal decision-making demonstrate the limits of attainable objectivity in economic contexts (Camerer, 1998).

Furthermore, seemingly objective long-term memories in the human mind can be externally altered, as shown in Loftus’ (1975) experiment, where participants "postulated the existence of an object that did exist in the scene” or false presuppositions. Findings exemplified how leading questions contribute to instances of a perceived appearance of objectivity.

While philosophers such as Descartes argue that humans possess an innate capacity for objectivity within their minds, and stages of development of objective abilities corroborate this view to some extent, research indicates that objectivity is further shaped and mediated by cultural norms and social structures.

This shaping of objectivity determines its malleability and relative differences across perceptions. It cannot be considered separate, as external reality, while separate from the mind itself, directly shapes constructs of objectivity within society. Cultural differences in perception demonstrate that perceptions of objectivity are often shaped by cultural frameworks. Perceptions of objective factual information and values vary significantly across cultures, with a commonly mentioned dichotomic contrast between East Asian and European reasoning. A comprehensive understanding of thinking cannot ignore the functions of culture that humans naturally rely upon. In contrast to the Western view of the world as “discrete and consisting of distinct objects” (Nisbett, 2003, p. 36), East Asians tend to view the world in much less disparate terms. .In Chinese culture, for instance, where self existed within an interconnected web of relationships and obligations, causality would be seen as being located in the field or in the relation between the object and the field. Attention to the field would encourage recognition of complexity and change, as well as of contradiction among its many and varied elements. (p. 36)

Extended to interpersonal relationships, conflict avoidance might become an objective consensus amongst members of society. “Since all action is in concert with others,” states Nisbett (p. 51), “harmony in relationships becomes a chief goal”. The inherent nuance and heterogeneity of cultures, therefore, contrast with the rationalist epistemic frameworks of reasoning and capacities of objective thinking as universal, separate, and innate.

Although humans nearly universally develop the capacity for objective perception and cognition during neurodevelopment, paradigm shifts in science make objectivity elusive. The interpretation of scientific objectivity relies on an openness to paradigm shifts, which contrasts with a static and consistent view of its objective nature.

Thomas Kuhn’s (1962) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions suggests that all objective facts within the scientific consensus are "scientific paradigms", subject to constant evolution over time. Evolved paradigms can be attributed to circumstances of groundbreaking discoveries, entirely altering the collective consensus in the scientific community. Kuhn suggests that the establishment of irrefutable facts in the scientific community is better understood as an entrenchment of perspective reinforced as a truth and potentially inhibiting progress. Scientific objectivity is therefore not absolute. Rather, shifting paradigms reject the overarching claim of objectivity as separable from social influences, thereby reiterating the nature of individual assumptions of objectivity as socially negotiated.

A particularly representative example in the history of science is the Copernican heliocentric model, which led to revolutionary changes in astronomy. However, it was largely discredited and ignored until subsequent experiments carried out by Kepler and Galileo (Park & Daston, 2006). In his writings, Copernicus questioned the frequent inconsistencies in Ptolemy's geocentric paradigms. As Kuhn (1962) explains, "Copernicus saw as counterinstances what most of Ptolemy's other successors had seen as puzzles in the match between observation and theory" (p. 79).

As such, one cannot establish a functionally objective system of beliefs to deduce from, as all dominant paradigms are only objective in the present. The paradigm, or what is previously expected and entirely accepted as objective truth, can be entirely upended. The advent of Copernican astronomy underscores that foundations are not unquestionable, as with time based upon the same observations, what was once viewed as an objective paradigm has been all but completely changed.

References

Camerer, C. (1998). Bounded rationality in individual decision making. Experimental Economics, 1(2), 163-183. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009944326196

Descartes, R. (2008). Meditations on first philosophy: With selections from the objections and replies. Oxford University Press.(Original work published 1641).

Kuhn, T. S. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions. University of Chicago Press.

Loftus, E. F. (1975). Leading questions and the eyewitness report. Cognitive Psychology, 7(4), 560-572. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(75)90023-7

Malik, F., & Marwaha, R. (2023, April 23). Cognitive development. StatPearls - NCBI Bookshelf. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK537095/#_ncbi_dlg_citbx_NBK537095

Moini, J., LoGalbo, A., & Ahangari, R. (2024). Foundations of the mind, brain, and behavioral relationships. Academic Press. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-323-95975-9.00022-6

Nisbett, R. E. (2003). The geography of thought: How Asians and Westerners think differently-- and why. Free Press.

Park, K., & Daston, L. (2006). The Cambridge history of science. Cambridge University Press.

Robinson, H. (2020). Dualism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2023 ed.). Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2023/entries/dualism/

Simon, H. A. (1978). Rationality as process and as product of thought. The American Economic Review, 68(2), 1-16. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1816653

Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185(4157), 1124-1131. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1738360

Winawer, J., Witthoft, N., Frank, M. C., Wu, L., Wade, A. R., & Boroditsky, L. (2007). Russian blues reveal effects of language on color discrimination. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104(19), 7780-7785. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0701644104