Abstract - This essay explores the ethics of animal experimentation through Martin Seligman’s work on Learned Helplessness, analyzing the principles of rationality, utilitarianism, and emotion. Seligman and proponents of animal experimentation justify such practices based on the principle of rationality, positing that animals lack cognitive capacities comparable to humans. Supporters of utilitarianism emphasize maximizing overall utility, often unfairly prioritizing human interests. However, these views are critiqued in light of modern research on animal cognition and emotions, revealing their capacity for self-awareness, empathy, and suffering. This essay argues that rationality alone is insufficient to determine moral status, as the theory itself is paradoxical when it comes to the shared traits of disabled humans and animals. It further critiques utilitarianism for neglecting moral emotions like compassion. Advocating for the principle of emotion, the essay underscores the ethical obligation to respect animals' intrinsic value and calls for a balanced framework that harmonizes rationality with empathy and care.

Since the 1970s, with the rise of individualism, psychology has shifted its focus from the influence of external factors to the decisions, expectations, and preferences of individuals. The prevalence of individualism gives rise to a sense of depression and meaninglessness, which is tied closely to the individual’s long-term feeling of helplessness. Former American Psychological Association (APA) president Martin Seligman completed his groundbreaking work Learned Helplessness1 (1972), exploring the psychological experiments involving animals to reveal the causes of helplessness in humans. In doing so, he sought treatment for psychological disorders triggered by learned helplessness, benefiting countless humans. In this essay, I aim to raise ethical questions regarding animal experimentation in an empirical research setting, questioning the commonly accepted defenses of rationalism and utilitarianism while shifting the emphasis to the principle of emotion.

According to Seligman, inspecting the simpler psychological processes of animals is essential to understanding that of humans. Testing psychological theories through animal experiments can help find ways to prevent and treat human depression, anxiety, and helplessness. He and his team conducted a series of animal experiments involving animals—pigeons were forced to endure hunger, dogs were subjected to electric shocks, rats were drowned in cold water, and infant monkeys were separated from their mothers, which all involved trapping and torturing animals in cages, depriving them of their freedom. By textual reports alone, the pain and trauma inflicted on the animals in these experiments are palpable. Although other psychologists have employed similar experimental strategies, the ones recorded in Learnt Helplessness provoke great uneasiness as they allegedly result in irreversible trauma to the subjects. Seligman justifies that these practices by arguing that, "if the suffering and damage these animals endure can significantly reduce human suffering and damage in the future, then the experiment is reasonable."2 For scientists aiming to improve the quality of human life, such experiments seem undoubtedly justifiable. Seligman’s view also represents the majority opinion in support of animal experimentation, as there are no better alternatives.

Seligman’s moral defense of animal experimentation finds ground

in the Principles of Rationality and Utilitarianism.

The principle of rationality was first introduced by the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle. He believed that the human body and emotions should be governed by the soul and reason.3 Animals, on the other hand, lack rationality and cannot comprehend human reasoning; they merely follow a primitive, instinctual frame of mind that exists from birth. In addition to Aristotle, Saint Thomas Aquinas also drew a line between rational and irrational beings, arguing that humans hold a dominant position in moral practice due to their capacity for rational activities.4 René Descartes also denied that animals possess rational capabilities: while human bodies are ingeniously arranged machines that use “language” to express thoughts, animal behavior is governed by instinct and cannot perform actions beyond that.5 Even when animals are trained to perform behaviors resembling rational actions, these behaviors still stem from their own instincts rather than rational thought. Consequently, humans, endowed with rationality, occupy a dominant position over animals.

Thus, from the perspective based on the principle of rationality, sacrificing animals for the benefit of human wellbeing is entirely reasonable. In summary, the principle of rationality in animal ethics differentiates humans from animals based on rational capacity and maintains that humans have no moral obligations towards animals, as the latter exist merely as tools. The moral principles that apply among rational beings, namely, humans with adequate education, do not extend to human-animal relations. However, the concept of “protecting animals” still exists as a moral contract among rational beings, providing only a limited “external reason” for pursuing animal ethics.

Another common defense of animal experimentation is based on Utilitarianism, which emphasizes “maximizing overall happiness.” Utilitarianism often acknowledges that mankind’s essential interests take precedence over those of animals if they are in conflict. For instance, when it comes to entertainment or commercial business, humans adhere to the principle that animals and humans have equal rights to life; however, when humanity faces imminent threats to their survival, their interests will override animal interests6. From a utilitarian perspective, sacrificing animals would be ethically justifiable in any medical experiment, as the discoveries would increase total welfare at minimal cost.

It is important to justify that humans have higher utility value than animals when applying Utilitarianism. Since humans have mutual expectations of each other, humans are moral subjects. However, animals are not because they do not set moral expectations for others. This might have led Robert Nozick to believe that “one cannot use or sacrifice humans to benefit others, but as long as the benefits outweigh the losses, one can use or sacrifice animals to benefit humans or other animals.”7 Alan White’s argument is even more direct: the difference between humans and animals is logical, not on the level of sensory experience. This means that logically speaking, humans are the only rights-holders that can exist.8 Synthesizing both arguments suggests that animals occupy an inferior moral position compared to humans, and thus sacrificing animals for the benefit of humans generates greater overall unity than allowing humans to suffer harm.

However, are the seemingly sufficient and reasonable defenses for animal experimentation beyond reproach? Compared to the principle of rationality, the principle of emotion in animal ethics offers a different perspective. It starts from basic human feelings of sympathy and compassion, considering animals as friends who deserve care and respect for their freedom and right to life. As an alternative way of viewing the relationship between humans and animals, the principle of emotion regards animals as the objects of human emotions. The validity of this principle can fully extend to the unidirectional relationship between humans and animals, which could be the reason behind human goodwill towards animals. This principle explains the motives for the conservation of animals, arguing that animal experimentation is morally wrong because there is a shared emotional connection between humans and animals. From the viewpoint of the principle of emotion, the principles of rationality and utilitarianism are flawed in at least three aspects: the underestimation of animals’ emotional and perceptual abilities, the inadequacy of rationality as a sole condition for a moral personhood, and the morally unjustifiable role of animals as mere instruments.

To begin with, the emotional and perceptual abilities of animals are greatly underestimated. The principle of rationality asserts that animals lack moral standing due to their perceived lack of reason, modern scientific research indicates that many animals possess complex emotions and cognitive abilities, such as the sensation of pain, empathy, and even basic reflection, evaluation, and resolution skills when encountering problems. Immanuel Kant argued that animals lack self-awareness and cannot reflect on their actions or inner selves like humans. However, contemporary studies demonstrate otherwise. Through methods such as the mirror test and marking test, scientists have shown that many animals can recognize their reflections and respond accordingly. Moreover, animals exhibit distinct emotional reactions such as pride, humility, and sympathy. For instance, when a dog successfully follows its owner's command and receives a reward, it displays excitement and pride; whereas, when it makes a mistake and is punished, it shows shame and retreat. These emotional responses not only prove that animals have self-awareness but also suggest that they can reflect on and evaluate their own actions. Thus, denying animals’ moral standing due to their supposed lack of reason and self-awareness under the principle of rationality is increasingly untenable. For example, the Morris Water Maze was a behavioral test assessing spatial learning and memory in rats, demonstrating their rationality by observing how they navigate to escape a hidden platform using environmental cues. In the experiment, rats have exhibited rational behavior by effectively using spatial cues to learn and remember the location of a secret escape platform. Such findings revealed that animals can reflect on their actions and experience conscious suffering. Ethical consistency demands that beings capable of such experiences receive moral consideration.

Possessing rationality does not necessarily qualify one as a moral subject. The principle of rationality asserts that only beings with rationality deserve to be moral subjects, but this standard is not even universally applicable even among humans. Infants, individuals with intellectual disabilities, and patients who have lost their rational abilities clearly cannot fully fulfill moral obligations or exercise rationality. If utilitarianism were applied strictly, it would justify sacrificing these individuals like infants or intellectually disabled people if their interests conflict with those of normal people, yet we still ascribe moral status to them. Therefore, when it comes to harming animals in experiments, it is reasonable to consider their shared traits with disabled individuals. Moral status, then, should not be determined solely by rational capacity; it also demands empathy, or the ability to experience and be empathetic towards another’s pain and pleasure. This indicates that human rights are not established through rationality alone, but through connecting with the emotions of other rational beings. Similarly, we cannot justify the rights of animals only on rational grounds. The legal basis for animal rights can be that they experience human-like emotions of empathy towards other animals and even humans, and it is out of these emotions that we care for and protect animals.

In animal experimentation, the role of animals as "instrumental" beings is also morally unjustifiable. Kant’s “indirect duty view”9 refutes the principle of rationality. He believes that humans should treat animals well not only because it contributes to the happiness of others but also because it contributes to the fulfillment of oneself. According to Kant, humans should not mistreat animals for the concern that people will develop a habit of harming animals, which is threatening to others, “because such treatment makes one’s heart insensitive to the suffering of animals, and a natural disposition that is very beneficial to morality in relations with others is weakened and gradually eradicated.” Although there is no direct duty between humans and animals, this does not mean that humans bear no responsibility for animals. For those beings that lack moral personality and free will, such as animals, we have an indirect duty to care for them, which we can fulfill through our direct duties to ourselves and others.

Moreover, Kant believed that treating animals well is essential for the perfection of one’s own virtue, that is, preventing the mistreatment of animals originates from a duty to oneself. In Kant’s view, “even gratitude for the long-term service of an old horse or an old dog (as if they were members of the family) indirectly belongs to human obligations in relation to these animals, but from a more directly stance, this gratitude is often just a duty to oneself.”10 As humans, one is obligated to strive for self-improvement, progressing from one relatively virtuous state to another. To witness the suffering of animals without lending a helping hand is, in Kant’s terms, to forgo an opportunity for moral growth and perfection of one’s character.

The principle of rationality and the stance of utilitarianism are overly inclined towards logical reasoning, neglecting the role of sensibility and emotion in ethical considerations. Human compassion, empathy, and respect for life—qualities that cannot be fully explained by rationality—form the foundations of moral actions. The absence of the principle of emotion can lead to a partial ethical system undervaluing individual lives and disregarding the significance of moral emotions. As early as the Middle Ages, Anselm Turmeda’s work Disputa de I’ase, condemned the cruel treatment of animals, questioning whether humans truly surpass animals in dignity and virtues.11 Similarly, in the 16th century, Montaigne’s essay “On Cruelty” pointed out that humans possess respect and responsibility.12 These characteristics connect us with animals and obligate us to treat them with justice, goodness, and kindness, indicating the urgency of correcting humans’ misbehavior of mistreating animals in experiments.

It is human empathy that enables us to understand the suffering and joy of animals, suggesting that even from a utilitarian perspective, harming animals for any reason is not applicable. Meanwhile, in Seligman’s defense of his experiments, he recognizes the equivalent of human physiological and psychological pain inflicted on animals, as well as experimented animals’ ability to feel pain is precisely the precondition for their engagements in the experiment. This shared ability to experience pain could be the reason why both Montaigne and Anselm negate mistreating animals, as well as providing evidence for the legitimacy of the principle of emotion over rationality by reducing the assumed difference between humans and animals. Therefore, Seligman’s logical system of animal ethics that prioritizes the principle of rationality from a scientific perspective stands weak as a defense. Rationality is not a sufficient justification to make animal experimentation acceptable as it instead strengthens the need for morals that grow from human emotion.

The tension between the principle of rationality and emotion in animal ethics mirrors the inherent conflict between human rationality and sensibility. Rationality tends to grasp the essence and focuses on universality; emotion looks at phenomena and places more emphasis on the individual's existential situation. For rationality, it is only possible to access the essence by excluding the diversities of countless individuals. It overlooks the individuality of animals as it starts from the fundamental difference between animals and humans. Yet, in the real world, we encounter not abstract entities but diverse, vivid lives. We experience feelings like joy, anger, sorrow, and happiness, and we empathize with the suffering and well-being of animals. The emotional resonance compels us to advocate for their rights of not being harmed for things that they do not deserve.

Notes

1 Seligman, Martin E. P. "Learned Helplessness." Annual Review of Medicine, vol. 23, 1 Feb 1972,

doi:10.1146/annurev.me.23.020172.002203.

2 [US] Martin Seligman: Learned Helplessness (People’s Publishing House, 2020).

Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 9, ed. Miao Litian (People’s University Press, 2009), 11.

3 Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 9, ed. Miao Litian (People’s University Press, 2009), 11.

4 Paul Crittenden. “Thomas Aquinas: Body and Soul,” in Life Hereafter, (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan,

2021), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54279-5_6

5 Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, eds. Oeuvres de Descartes, 11 (Paris: Vrin, 1982-1991).

Saskia Stucki. One Rights: Human and Animal Rights in the Anthropocene. (Cham: Springer, 2023), DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-19201-2.

6 Robert Nozick. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1974), 39.

7 Alan R. White, “Rights and claims,” in Law and Philosophy 1, no. 2 (1982): 315-336.

8 Alan R. White, “Rights and claims,” in Law and Philosophy 1, no. 2 (1982): 315-336.

9 Milene Consenso Tonetto. “Kant’s Concept of Indirect Duties and Environmental Ethics.” Ethics 16,

no. 3(2017)” 519–532. DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2017v16n3p519.

10 [Eng] Immanuel Kant. Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Li Qiuling (Beijing: China Renmin University Press,

2012), 221.

11 Anselm Turmada, La Disputa de l’ase (Barcelona: Editorial Barcino, 2017).

12 Michel de. Montaigne, The Complete Essays (1588), trans. M. A. Screech (Harmondsworth: Penguin,

1991).

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