Responsibility for our beliefs, whether private or public, is crucial as long as agency remains fundamental to humanity. This essay will explore the concept of freedom, its role in human identity and dignity, and how it necessitates responsibility for our beliefs. By examining philosophical perspectives from Viktor Frankl, Hannah Arendt, and others through an existentialist lens, I argue that freedom and responsibility are inextricably tied.

Frankl (1946), in his seminal work Man's Search for Meaning, posits that humans are free in their ability to choose their attitude in any given set of circumstances. This internal freedom is the crux of the memoir, and according to Frankl (1946), it is not only something that gives life meaning but also something that “cannot be taken away.” This means that—even in the most uncontrollable and trying of circumstances—humans can control, and therefore must be responsible for, their thoughts and reactions to their situations: their beliefs.

Freedom, therefore, is not merely the absence of external constraints but the presence of internal agency (Frankl 1946). This agency is inherently desirable as it affirms our individuality and capacity for self-determination. When we exercise our freedom to believe or disbelieve, we actively engage in a process that shapes our identity and moral compass.

The Moral Imperative of Responsibility

Given that freedom equates to agency, individuals must be responsible for their beliefs, as the natural consequence of one’s beliefs is aligned action, even through inaction. Arendt's notion of moral responsibility, introduced in her book Responsibility and Judgement, suggests that individuals should be held accountable for their actions as well as the beliefs that drive them. She states, “In the centre of moral considerations of human conduct stands the self; in the centre of political considerations of conduct stands the world” (Arendt, 2003). This responsibility is a fundamental aspect of ethical behaviour and social—or political—integrity. Arendt argues that shirking this responsibility leads to the "banality of evil", where, as she witnessed Nazi soldiers during the Holocaust, ordinary individuals commit atrocities simply by following orders without reflecting on the morality of their actions.

This interconnection between freedom and responsibility also aligns with the ideas of Sartre (1943), who in his book Being and Nothingness, posits that humans are condemned to be free. Sartre argues that because we are free to make choices, we are also responsible for their consequences. This responsibility extends to our beliefs, as they form the basis of our actions.

Critics like Hume and Foucault have argued for a more passive view of human behaviour, where individuals are heavily influenced by external factors and therefore less responsible for their beliefs. Hume (1777), in his empirical approach, suggests that human beliefs are primarily shaped by sensory experiences and passions, reducing the role of rational agency. Foucault, on the other hand, emphasizes the pervasive influence of societal power structures on individual beliefs. As he states in his book Archaeology of Knowledge, “There is no statement in general, no free, neutral, independent statement; [...] It is always part of a network of statements, in which it has a role, however minimal it may be, to play” (Foucault, 1969). The truths from which we derive our beliefs are engineered by those holding power in the status quo, which is one among infinite versions of the discourses we occupy. Freedom, and therefore responsibility, are illusions to Foucault.

In the meantime, Frankl's counterpoint surrounds the active role of personal agency even in the most constrained circumstances. To be free means to be responsible, and this responsibility often requires sacrifice and a conscious effort to uphold one's principles against external pressures. His concept of "tragic optimism" highlights that even in suffering individuals can find meaning through the choices they make, reaffirming their agency and responsibility (Frankl, 1984).

Frankl and Foucault have opposing stances on the individual’s state of freedom, and therefore their capability for responsibility. However, both theories were conceived during a period of imprisonment: Frankl his physical imprisonment in multiple Nazi concentration camps, and Foucault our general state of imprisonment within current systems of information.

Freedom and responsibility are not innate traits, but habits that need to be practiced. Likewise, we are not merely passive recipients of external systems; we actively create and enforce these systems for ourselves and others. This active participation underscores our responsibility to reflect on and choose our beliefs.

Awareness of and reflection on the systems we inhabit play a critical role in this process. As Lynch (2010) argues, understanding the influence of external systems on our beliefs enables us to privately choose to support or resist these systems. For instance, consider a student who disagrees with a professor but remains silent for fear of failing the class. They are still exercising their inner freedom by holding on to their beliefs, even if they cannot publicly express them. This inner freedom is a form of responsibility, where the individual maintains integrity despite external constraints.

The Consequences of Abdicating Responsibility

Even without full self-awareness, individuals bear responsibility for their beliefs. They may be influenced by misinformation or online echo chambers, but as Arendt (1987) argues, their continued participation in society at large means that they are inevitably responsible for how they form beliefs.

As such, beliefs manifest in a plethora of manners but primarily are formed in response to information and shaped by our attitudes. Consider the analogy of online radicalization and the anti-vaccination wave regarding the COVID-19 pandemic. According to Pew Research Centre (2024), only 23 percent of American adults are up to date on their COVID-19 vaccine, despite cases spiking in early 2024. By continuing to engage in anti-vaccination content online despite the continued hospitalization of unvaccinated relatives in real life, COVID anti-vaxxers actively allowed their cognitive dissonance to fester instead of holding themselves accountable.

This is especially vital because beliefs always lead to action. By holding people responsible for their actions, we are indirectly holding them responsible for their beliefs.

Even further, absolution from responsibility for our beliefs is not simply lazy or idealistic; it is dangerous. The notion suggests that we do not need the freedom to form those beliefs, ultimately leading to a passive surrender to external systems and a diminishment of our humanity. Frankl's perspective emphasizes that even under severe indoctrination, such as being born into a cult, the right to freedom remains. To achieve this freedom, one must accept responsibility for their beliefs, only then enabling the possibility of breaking free from indoctrination.

A significant caveat to this stance is the challenge of discerning truth in the face of false information, such as Cold War USSR propaganda. It is as Foucault argues; even when thinking freely and honestly, individuals can be misled. However, though the Cold War era has long past, misinformation is more prevalent than ever before. With the digital reality that we now occupy, it is increasingly difficult for us to exercise our freedoms without information tampering from sources such as AI deepfakes, digital propaganda, and indoctrination campaigns. This adds a layer of complexity to the questions of individual responsibility limits and the role of external influences.

Despite this, surrendering responsibility for our beliefs undermines not just our individuality but our very humanity. The exercise of our agency is proof of our existence; it should be a right that we cling to in the face of these epistemic injustices, both individually and collectively, through the cultivation of a society where the ability to be free in our beliefs is unhindered by malicious discourse. This looks like a society where information is free rather than restricted. A society that is not weaponized by those wielding power for their own agendas. In fact, countries like Finland are already creating such environments by integrating education against fake news and trolls into their curriculum from as early as elementary school.

In addressing this caveat, it is also crucial to distinguish between wilful ignorance and genuine deception. While the latter can significantly impair one's capacity to form sound beliefs, the former involves a conscious decision to avoid engaging with challenging information. This distinction underscores the importance of intellectual humility and the continuous pursuit of knowledge as part of our responsibility.

Freedom as Resistance Against Oppressive Power

Society does have, and has always had, systems of responsibility in place. Even before the existence of formal courts of law as they are in modern society, there has been a variety of forms through which consequence and responsibility manifest, such as social contracts. However, these systems also have been, and will always be, flawed; there is no universal metric for judgement, especially in a status quo where corruption and individualism are rampant. Therefore, there is no guarantee that society can hold one responsible for their beliefs fairly.

At the end of the day, it is only we who can hold ourselves responsible. To retain responsibility for our beliefs, even privately, is to exercise freedom—and this agency to self-determine belief is the utmost and sometimes only resistance we have against oppressive institutions. Thus, responsibility for our beliefs is not just a philosophical ideal but a practical necessity for maintaining human dignity and agency in an increasingly complex world.

Institutions of power often seek to dictate beliefs to maintain control. As Orwell (2017) so famously illustrated in his book Orwell on Truth, “[Powerful institutions] declare [themselves] infallible, and at the same time it attacks the very concept of objective truth.” However, recognizing and asserting our responsibility for our beliefs serves as a form of resistance against such coercion. By critically examining and taking ownership of our beliefs, we assert our independence and protect our moral and intellectual integrity.

In conclusion, if retaining agency is important to humanity, we must be held responsible for our beliefs. This responsibility is integral to exercising freedom, maintaining moral integrity, and affirming our individuality against external pressures.

Embracing responsibility for our beliefs not only enhances our personal development but also contributes to a collectively more just and reflective society that will not fall as easily to attempts to obfuscate the truth or muddy our discourses. Therefore, the practice of critically evaluating and taking ownership of our beliefs is not only a philosophical imperative but a necessary condition for true freedom and human dignity. Said practice will be difficult, and at times actively uncomfortable, but it is still imperative that we try.

References

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